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A decade or so ago it was possible to find people who
were able to explain exactly how and why the global
telephone system and how large distributed computer
systems worked. These experts shared an under-
standing of architectures and participated in a process
by which de jure standards slowly and cumbersomely,
but nevertheless reliably, delivered a vendor neutral
language for defining big complex systems.
Then things began to change in response to factors
such as deregulation and convergence. The important
standards became the de facto ones, and the problem
of how to get systems and applications to exchange
data and share in transactions changed into one of
organising and managing channels, supply chains and
client relationships.
This did not happen smoothly. The early reaction
of traditional infrastructure suppliers was vociferous.
They said that you could not possibly do business on
the Internet, it is unsafe, unreliable and insecure. Best
effort relationships could not deliver the quality of
service required by industry and the Internet could
never be more than a playpen for academics. The
entirely different reaction of the ‘dot.com revolution’
was that the Internet was the only place you could
make interesting investments and invent new business
models. That bubble burst, of course, and a new equi-
librium emerged where computers were no longer
connected to each other but were connected to the net
and an enterprise which does not have some visibility in
that global public space is considered rather unusual.
The thing I want to stress is that these transforma-
tions did not happen as a result of central direction 
or planning, they emerged. The new infrastructure
was not designed and, even now, we may have some
theories but there is no general consensus about 
how it all works. The fact that some enterprises have
found ways of making sense of it, discovered modes of
operation within it and exploited the opportunities it
affords is an example of co-evolution and adaptation;
it is what enterprises do.
But what of the National Health Service (NHS)
during this period? Here the constraints and drivers
seem to have been entirely different and any survey of
systems and networks, supplier relationships and the
procurement processes shows very little evidence that
what has been going on in the rest of the world has
had any impact except at the most basic technological
levels.
So, in the debate about the systems aspects of
modernisation in the NHS infrastructure we have a
number of separate discourses.
 A political discourse which says ‘why can’t the health
service be more like other sectors, enabling itself
through information systems and networks and
offering flexible, responsive client/patient relation-
ships just like the world of e-commerce? And, why
can’t this be delivered in time for the next election?
 A programme development and management
discourse which, in an attempt to contain risks, uses
the concepts and methods of a bygone age to trans-
late political aspirations and demands into pleas for
the appropriate standards and demands for uncritical
acceptance of its own narrow rhetoric of control.
 A supplier discourse which is built on a set of implicit
and largely unanalysed assumptions about their cur-
rent practice in delivering e-business information
and communications infrastructure, which is to a
large extent alien to accepted wisdom and practice
of health care and public service.
 A clinical discourse concerned with the ethics and
governance of care and the exercise of custodian-
ship of clinical information and transactions:
responsibilities which are situated in the real world
of surgeries and wards rather than in the virtual and
abstract one of networks and systems.
 Patient discourses about the experience of health
and of illness, empowerment and safety, informed-
ness, access and availability.
Communication within these different world views 
is difficult enough. Communication between them 
is well nigh impossible. This is why Integrated Care
Record Services (ICRS) is so difficult.1
Even if we are smart enough to develop common
languages for framing these questions and exploring
their solutions, the expectation that a profound
transformation of the NHS can be delivered through
programming centrally prescribed processes and re-
lationships in an infrastructure which is then installed
and imposed in a top-down fashion, is patently absurd.
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The remark that such an analysis is not politically
correct and that those who articulate it should be
ostracised is simply another symptom of the barriers
of understanding between the discourses and the
world views they embody.
This is not an argument to reject short-term targets.
The changes which have taken place in the commer-
cial sector have been forced by market conditions, and
enterprises either responded or died. The NHS must
respond to the political and social forces which have
implications which are just as real. My argument is
that the NHS needs to think harder, be more realistic
about the nature, scale and complexity of the things 
it is attempting to organise and, most importantly,
all parties must recognise that any progress which is
going to be made will emerge out of the energy and
commitment of health communities and networks; it
will not come from outside or from above.
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